We propose two generalizations of the Davis and Maschler (1965) reduced game property to economies with asymmetric information and apply them in the characterization of two solution concepts. One is Wilson's (1978) Coarse Core and the other is a subsolution of it which we call the Coarse+ Core.
the di®erent cores of an economy with asymmetric information di®er in the economy itself rather than in the way allocations are improved upon, and while di®erences in the underlying economies can lead to di®erent Core allocations, they cannot lead to di®erences in the de¯nition of the Core. Thus, Wilson's (1978) Coarse Core and Vohra's (1997) Nevertheless, even controlling for the di®erent sets of feasible allocations, several de¯nitions of Core concepts remain. It should be stressed that the di®erences do not lie in the timing of the agents' evaluation of di®erent allocations. If the agents evaluate the desirability of di®erent bundles before they get any information, the resulting Core concept will be an ex-ante concept.
If, on the other hand, the agents use their private information while evaluating bundles, the Core concept will be an interim concept. But even restricting attention to the interim phase, the phase where agents do have asymmetric information, we¯nd no consensus about the de¯nition of the core.
There are several ways to justify a given solution concept. One may justify it by its intuitive appeal, one may show an interesting class of economies where the concept is non-empty, or one may show that the concept satis¯es nice properties. In this paper we follow the axiomatic approach. Instead of trying to generalize the Core directly to economies with asymmetric information, we generalize some properties that characterize the Core in the context of perfect information economies and see if they characterize some solution concept in the context of asymmetric information, and if so, we ask which concept they characterize. In particular, we choose to follow the lines of Peleg's (1985) axiomatization of the Core of cooperative games without side payments. There the axioms used are Individual rationality, Non-emptiness, Consistency and Converse Consistency. With a slight modi¯cation of the axioms, Serrano and Volij (1997) show that the Core of an economy with perfect information is characterized by One Person Rationality , Consistency and Converse Consistency. As it is well-known, the consistency property depends on the way the reduced game is de¯ned. Peleg (1985) , Serrano and Volij (1997) and many others apply the reduced game that is inspired by Davis and Maschler (1965) . According to this approach, a coalition in a reduced economy with respect to a status quo can obtain the cooperation of agents outside the reduced economy by compensating them with bundles that are more attractive than the status quo ones. 1 When we want to adapt the Davis-Maschler reduced game to economies with asymmetric information, we¯nd two equally appealing ways to do so, appealing in the sense that they preserve the usual interpretation of the reduced economy. They di®er in the way the individual s in the reduced economy compensate the individuals outside it for their cooperation. The compensation should be attractive enough for the individuals outside the reduced economy to be willing to cooperate but there are at least two ways to make a proposal acceptable. One is to make a proposal that is common knowledge among the proposers and proposees that it is bene¯cial to all the parties involved. That is, the proposal should remain attractive even after learning that everybody agrees to its terms, that everybody knows that everybody agrees to its terms, and so on. Another way to make an acceptable proposal is to propose something that dominates the status-quo, namely that remains attractive no matter what can be learned from it. Proposals like this cannot be refused. Our¯ndings are as follows. When we follow the¯rst way to make acceptable proposals in order to de¯ne the reduced economy, it turns out that Wilson's (1978) Coarse Core is characterized by the axioms of One Person Rationality, Consistency and Converse Consistency. When, on the other hand, we use proposals that cannot be refused in order to de¯ne the reduced economy, we get that the same three axioms, are not enough to characterize a solution concept. Adding the axiom of Weak E±ciency, however, su±ces to characterize a Core concept that has not been de¯ned before, and that we call the Coarse+ Core. In the case of economies with perfect information, One Person Rationality and Consistency imply Weak E±ciency. Consequently, this last axiom, though satis¯ed by the Core, is not required. When we deal with economies with asymmetric information, and when getting cooperation from someone requires proposals that cannot be refused, One Person Rationality, Consistency and Weak E±ciency become independent axioms, and all of them are required to get a tight characterization of the Core. It turns out that this second Core concept is a subset of the Coarse Core.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some basic de¯nitions regarding the agents that compose an economy with asymmetric information. Section 3 reviews several de¯nitions of allocations that have appeared in the literature and further discusses alternative notions of improving coalitions. It ends with the de¯nition of the associated Core concepts.
Section 4 presents a characterization of two solution concepts. One is Wilson's (1978) Coarse Core and the other is a subsolution of it which we call the Coarse+ Core. Both axiomatizations are obtained by appropriately interpreting and generalizing the reduced economies that are behind the consistency properties that characterize the core of economies with perfect information.
Preliminaries
Let (-; F ; ¹) be a measure space and let U be a set of names. Elements of F are called events.
De¯nition 1 An agent i 2 U is a fourtuple (X i ; F i ; u i ; e i ) where: A bundle for agent i is a measurable function x i : -! X i that assigns a commodity vector to each state of the world. We denote the set of bundles for i by IB i . For each bundle
Finite subsets of U are called coalitions. Let N be a coalition, let E be an event and let i 2 N be an agent. We say that i knows E at state ! if there is and event C 2 F i that i can discern, such that ! 2 C µ E. We say that the event E is common knowledge at ! among the members of N if there is an event C 2 \ k2N F k that all of them can discern, such that ! 2 C µ E. Given two measurable functions f : -! IR and g : -! IR, we say that an agent knows that f > g, if he knows the event f! : f(!) > g(!)g: When a ¾-algebra F i is generated by a measurable partition of the state space -, we denote by PF i the partition of -that generates F i and we write PF i (!)
for the element of the partition that contains state !. We denote the¯nest common coarsening of the partitions (PF i ) i2N by PF.
De¯nition 2 A pre-economy with asymmetric information, (X i ; F i ; u i ; e i ) i2N , is a¯nite collection of agents.
There are several assumptions that can be made about the pre-economy, some of which, for example, common prior,¯nite dimensional commodity space, etc., have already been implicitly made. We shall enumerate some conditions that can possibly be assumed on the pre-economy.
Alternative Assumptions on the Pre-Economy
Assumptions on the measure space { The measure space (-; F; ¹) is¯nite and ¹ assigns positive probability to each of the states of the world.
{ The measure space (-; F; ¹) is in¯nite, and ¹ is ¾-additive.
{ -is a product set, namely -= Q i2N T i where T i is the set of agent i's types.
Assumptions on the utility functions u i .
Assumptions on the endowments { For each i 2 N , e i is measurable with respect to F i .
Assumptions on the information¯elds { For each i 2 N , F i generates a countable partition of -where each partition cell has positive measure.
No matter which assumptions we choose to make about its components, a pre-economy is a description of the individuals that compose it and of the uncertainty they face. In particular, the description of the pre-economy does not tell anything about the activities the agents can engage in, the kind of contracts they can sign, or when those activities or contracts take place and are carried out. Furthermore, the description of the pre-economy does not tell us about the possibilities of exchange of information the agents have. Instead, a pre-economy is just a description of the agents' characteristics or more generally, a collection of agents facing some common background uncertainty.
3 Towards a De¯nition of the Core
Allocations
In order to de¯ne an economy, it is essential to complement the individuals' characteristics with a description of what they can do. We can think of this as the rules of the game. Without this set of feasible outcomes, we cannot even start to predict the physical outcome of a pre-economy. This description of what di®erent coalitions can do, is summarized by the concept of an S-allocation.
Intuitively, an S-allocation is the set of bundles that the coalition S can guarantee for themselves.
For a coalition S, we denote by A(S) the set all its S-allocations. A typical member of A(S) is a function y : S ! [ i2S IB i such that y(i) 2 IB i ; 8i 2 S. N -allocations are simply called allocations.
Note that the set of S-allocations is a general enough concept to allow for production possibilities or for costs of forming coalitions. An S-allocation can be interpreted as a distribution of bundles among the members of S that they can carry out without the consent of the other members of the pre-economy. If y is an S-allocation and T µ S, we write y T for the projection of y on T and, in particular, y i for y(i).
Di®erent de¯nitions of S-allocations correspond to di®erent social arrangements or social norms. Below we give a list of some possible de¯nitions of S-allocations, some of which have appeared in the literature. (The relevant papers appear in parenthesis.)
Alternative de¯nitions of S-allocations
{ (Allen (1992) , Yannelis (1991) , Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993) , Hahn and Yannelis (1995) ) An S-allocation is a collection of bundles y : S ! [ i2S IB i with y i 2 IB i , such that:
{ (Allen (1994) ) An S-allocation is a collection of bundles y : S ! [ i2S IB i with y i 2 IB i , such that:
2. For all i 2 S, y i ¡ e i is measurable with respect to an exogenously given ¾-¯eld f i (S)((F i ) i2S ) (note that the exogenous ¾-¯eld depends on the coalition).
{ (Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993) ) An S-allocation is a collection of bundles y : S ! [ i2S IB i with y i 2 IB i , such that:
For all i 2 S, y i is measurable with respect to the ¾-algebra generated by [ k2S F k .
{ (Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993) ) An S-allocation is a collection of bundles y : S ! [ i2S IB i with y i 2 IB i , such that: Wilson (1978) ) An S-allocation is a collection of bundles y : S ! [ i2S IB i with y i 2 IB i , such that:
{ (Vohra (1997) ) When the state space is the product of the players' types and the information structure is generated by the types, an S-allocation is a collection of bundles y : S ! [ i2S IB i with y i 2 IB i , such that:
. For all i 2 S, y i is measurable with respect to the ¾-algebra generated by [ k2S F k , 3. y S is incentive compatible; namely
Each of the above de¯nitions of S-allocations makes sense in di®erent contexts. The Sallocations used in Vohra (1997) , for example, are natural when individuals face not only physical but also incentive constraints. The S-allocations used in Wilson (1978) , on the other hand, make sense when the true state is veri¯able at the time contracts are ful¯lled.
We can now present the de¯nition of an economy.
De¯nition 3 An economy is a pair hPE; (A(S)) SµN i where PE = (X i ; F i ; u i ; e i ) i2N is a preeconomy and (A(S)) SµN is the collection of all its S-allocations.
We are interested in economies where allocations are agreed upon in the interim phase, namely after each agent knows his own private information but before the realized state is revealed to him. The natural de¯nition of individual rationality in this case is the following. 
De¯nition 4 Let
In other words, an allocation is individually rational if there is no agent i, fig-allocation y 2 A(fig) and state ! at which i knows that he prefers y to x i . Next, we de¯ne weak e±ciency as follows:
De¯nition 5 Let hPE; (A(S)) SµN i be an economy. An allocation x 2 A(N ) is weakly e±cient if there is no allocation y 2 A(N) and state ! 2 -at which it is common knowledge that
If -is the only event that is common knowledge among the members of N , x 2 A(N ) is weakly e±cient if and only if there is no allocation y 2 A(N ) that is preferred by all agents at every state of the world.
Improving Coalitions
What complicates the analysis of improving coalitions in economies with asymmetric information is that agents are necessarily conscious of the fact that they are improving upon an allocation when they are doing so. However, if and how they update their information based on this is implicit in the particular de¯nition of improving coalitions which one uses. If agents update and re¯ne their information based on the fact that they are improving upon an allocation, they may decide that a proposed improving allocation is in fact not desirable.
To circumvent this problem, Wilson (1978) proposed a de¯nition of improving coalitions which does not rely on agents proposing a blocking move over the status quo. Instead, a coalition S improves upon the status quo if and only if it is self evident to them that there exists an alternative S-allocation that each agent in S strictly prefers. Formally:
De¯nition 6 (Wilson (1978)) A coalition S (coarsely) improves upon allocation x 2
A(N ) if there exists an S-allocation y, and a state ! at which it is common knowledge among the members of S that:
That is, in order for the coalition S to (coarsely) improve upon the status quo, agents need not communicate in any way, since it is common knowledge that all agents in S are better o® from y than they were from x S . Wilson's coarse de¯nition has also been used by Kobayashi (1980) , who applies it to economies with production and by Vohra (1997) , who applies it to the set of incentive compatible allocations.
To see how agents improve upon an allocation using Wilson's notion of coarse blocking consider the following example from Wilson (1978) with a single commodity in which the status quo is the endowment. Suppose that each agent has a constant utility function u = ln(a) and there exists a common
¢ . Note that in this example f! 1 ; ! 2 ; ! 3 g is the only event which is common knowledge among the grand coalition. Then, at any state, it is common knowledge among the
that the allocation y is preferred by all agents to the endowment. The agents in S need not communicate among one another in order to determine that y is preferred over e; no agent needs to \propose" y and convince them that it is better. To the agents in S, it is self evident that y is preferred to e by all of them, and therefore this fact does not carry any new informational content. Consequently, after taking into account that y is preferred to e, the agents still prefer y to e.
One may think that the common knowledge restriction placed upon coalitions in order to improve upon allocations is too strict, and one might imagine several alternative ways in which coalitions could improve upon the status quo without it being common knowledge that all agents in a coalition are made better o®. To this end, Hahn and Yannelis (1995) have suggested the following alternative de¯nition of an improving coalition:
De¯nition 7 (Hahn and Yannelis (1995)) A coalition S (naÄ ³vely) improves upon allocation x 2 A(N ) if there exists an S-allocation y, and a state ! such that:
That is, a coalition S improves upon the status quo x if there exists an allocation y 2 A(S) and a state ! at which they know that they prefer y to x. We call this improvement naÄ ³ve because the agents do not update their information based on the fact that they are part of an improving coalition. This point is best illustrated by considering the classic \trading envelopes" example. 3
Consider the economy described in Table 2 with two agents, a single commodity x which we can think of as money, four states of the world, and a common prior ¹ = ¡ 1 4 ; ¢ . We assume that each agent has a constant across states utility function given by u(a) = a. Suppose the true state of the world is ! ¤ = ! 3 . Then, agent 1 believes the state is either ! 2 or ! 3 but he is certain that his \envelope" has $4. Agent 2 believes the state is either ! 3 or ! 4 , but she is certain that her envelope contains $8. Now consider the allocation which is achieved by exchanging endowments, that is, \trading envelopes". Given that the true state of the world is ! 3 , agent 1 is better o® in expected value from the trade since the expected utility of his envelope is now 5, which is greater than the sure utility of 4 which he received from his endowment. Similarly, agent 2 is better o® since she now has an expected utility of 10 instead of the sure utility of 8 which she received from her endowment. That is, the allocation y in Table 2 above naÄ ³vely improves upon the endowment. Consider what agent 2 should be able to deduce.
At ! 3 , she knows only that the state is either ! 3 or ! 4 . Furthermore, she knows that agent 1 knows that the state is either in f! 2 ; ! 3 g or that the state is ! 4 . Obviously agent 2 prefers trading envelopes to keeping her endowment because of the hope that the state is ! 4 . However,
3 For a complete analysis of the envelopes example, see Nalebu® (1989) and Geanakoplos (1992) .
it is clear that if the state were ! 4 , agent 1 would not want to trade envelopes. That is, from the very fact that she is blocking with allocation y, agent 2 should be able to learn that the true state is ! 3 . Agents who are in a naÄ ³ve improving coalition fail to update their prior information based on the \common knowledge" fact that they are blocking. Note that in this example, the agents do not (coarsely) improve upon the endowments by trading envelopes since it cannot be common knowledge that both agents expect a gain. 4
Although the common knowledge requirement of the coarse improving coalitions avoid the \unsophisticated" types of blocking that the naÄ ³ve form of blocking is susceptible to, the requirement that it be common knowledge among all agents in a coalition to improve upon the status quo is rather demanding. The previous two examples illustrate that the agents in an improving coalition should be able to update their information from the fact that they are part of an improving coalition. However, once one allows for updating, one must accept the possibility that agents can iteratively update their information ad in¯nitum. In order to avoid such complications,
we introduce a notion of improving coalitions based on dominant o®ers. Consider the following de¯nition:
De¯nition 8 (Lee (1997)) A coalition S (individualistically) improves upon allocation
x 2 A(N ) if there exists an agent j 2 S, S-allocation y 2 A(S), and state ! such that:
In this de¯nition, there is one \active" agent, j, who sees an opportunity for personal gain and makes proposals to the remaining members of S which they \cannot refuse." 5 By using dominant proposals, this de¯nition avoids the problems of the naÄ ³ve de¯nition, since any agent in S n fjg is made strictly better o® at every state, and the fact that he accepts the proposal reveals nothing to agent j. That is, agents update their information taking into account the fact that they ¢ . Agents' utility functions are constant across states and given by u(a; b) = minfa; bg for both agents and that the S-allocations are those as de¯ned by Wilson (1978) .
ff! 1 ; ! 2 gg (5; 0) (5; 0) (6; 1) (2:5; 2:5) 2 ff! 1 g; f! 2 gg (1; 1) (0; 5) (0; 0) (2:5; 2:5) Table 3 Since -is the only common knowledge event, the endowment cannot be coarsely improved upon since there is no way to make agent 2 better o® in state ! 1 . However, suppose that the state is ! ¤ = ! 2 . Then, agent 2 can o®er the allocation y to agent 1 which he cannot refuse.
Under the blocking allocation y, agent 2 is better o® in state ! 2 since her utility increases from 0 to 2.5. Agent 1 is strictly better o® in all states: y 1 is a bundle which agent 1 cannot refuse. Note that from the proposal that agent 2 makes, agent 1 can in fact infer that the true state must be ! 2 . However, this information does not change agent 1's optimal behavior since y 1 is a bundle which makes him better o® in all states. Furthermore, since the proposal was strictly dominant, the fact that agent 1 accepts her proposal reveals nothing to agent 2.
The example from Table 3 shows that the individualistic de¯nition of improving coalitions can improve upon allocations which the coarse de¯nition cannot. However, it places the restriction that there can only be one \active" agent and there exist simple economies in which one active agent may not be able to initiate a successful improving coalition, whereas two or more can.
Consider the following economy with four states of the world and three commodities a; b, and c.
There is a common prior given by ¹ = (:25; :25; :25; :25) and the constant across states utility function for all agents is u(a; b; c) = minfa; b; cg. The consumption set for each agent is X i = IR 3 + and the S-allocations are given by those as de¯ned by Wilson (1978) .
ff! 1 ; ! 2 g; f! 3 g; f! 4 gg (1; 0; 0) (1; 0; 0) (1; 0; 0) (1; 1; 1) 2 ff! 1 g; f! 2 ; ! 3 g; f! 4 gg (0; 1; 0) (0; 1; 0) (0; 1; 0) (1; 1; 1) 3 ff! 1 ; ! 2 ; ! 3 ; ! 4 gg (0; 0; 1) (0; 0; 1) (0; 0; 1) (0; 0; 1) Table 4 It is not di±cult to check that the endowment cannot be (coarsely) improved upon by any coalition. It is clear also that no coalition can individualistically improve upon the endowment since there is no agent who, by himself, can make any other agent better o® in states ! 1 ; ! 2 and
We now show that it is possible for the agents to improve upon the endowment when agents 1 and 2 are active, and agent 3 is passive. Suppose that ! ¤ = ! 1 ; ! 2 or ! 3 and consider the following allocation: Agent 3 is better o® in every state from this allocation compared to the endowment. Since the true state is ! 2 ; ! 3 or ! 4 , the event f! 1 ; ! 2 ; ! 3 g is common knowledge between agents 1 and 2, and it is clear that they are both better o® in this event under the proposed allocation.
We now de¯ne a generalized version of the individualistic improving coalition which allows for coalitions to make dominant o®ers.
De¯nition 9 A coalition S (Coarsely+) improves upon an allocation x 2 A(N) if there exists an S-allocation y, a state ! and a partition fA; P g of S such that:
2. It is common knowledge at ! among the members of A that
According to the above de¯nition, an allocation x can be improved upon by a coalition S, if there is a subgroup A of active agents that can make a proposal to the remaining agents, P , that cannot be refused and that is commonly known by the members of A that is preferred to x.
The Coarse+ notion of improving coalitions lies between the individualistic and coarse definitions. Note that when P = ;, the Coarse+ de¯nition is identical to the coarse de¯nition of Wilson (1978) (De¯nition 6). However, when A is a singleton, the Coarse+ de¯nition coincides with the individualistic de¯nition (De¯nition 8). 6 We call this notion of improving Coarse+ since it uses the common knowledge requirement of the coarse de¯nition, but adds the possibility of using dominant o®ers in order to improve upon the status quo.
Solutions
Now that several notions of improving coalitions have been de¯ned, we can proceed to give several alternative de¯nitions of the Core for economies with asymmetric information. Any de¯nition of the Core is an example of a solution concept for a class of economies and hence we begin by de¯ning what a solution is.
De¯nition 10 Let E be a class of economies. A solution on E is a set-valued function ' that assigns to each economy hPE; (A(S)) SµN i 2 E a set of allocations in A(N ).
For example, ² The Empty solution assigns to each economy in E the empty set.
² The Pareto optimal solution (PO) assigns to each economy in E the set of its weakly e±cient allocations.
² The Individually Rational (IR) solution assigns to each economy in E the set of its individually rational allocations.
² The Coarse Core (CC) assigns to each economy in E the set of the allocations that are (coarsely) improved upon by no coalition.
² The Individualistic Core (IC) assigns to each economy in E the set of the allocations that are (individualistically) improved upon by no coalition.
² The Coarse+ Core (C + ) assigns to each economy in E the set of the allocations that are (coarsely+) improved upon by no coalition.
An Axiomatic Approach
The reason why there are many alternative de¯nitions of the improving coalitions and of the Core of an economy with asymmetric information is that there are several appealing ways to generalize the de¯nition of the Core of an economy with perfect information. Recall that an allocation x in an economy with perfect information is improved upon by a coalition S if there is an S-allocation that provides each member of S with a higher utility than the allocation x. Formally, coalition S improves upon allocation x 2 A(N ) if there is an S-allocation y 2 A(S) such that u i (y i ) > u i (x i ) for all i 2 S. This formal de¯nition can be interpreted in two ways. One interpretation is that it is self-evident to the members of S that the S-allocation is preferred by all of them to the status quo. In other words, nobody needs to point out that y is preferred to x S for them to realize so.
Namely it is common knowledge among the members of S that all of them prefer y to x. The second interpretation is that there is a member i of S that can make S n fig a proposal that they \cannot refuse," and that if accepted, is bene¯cial to i. The proposal would be phrased as:
\Give me your endowments and I will give you y in return." Note that it is dominant for the proposees to accept the o®er and thus it is truly one that S n fig cannot refuse. Furthermore, for the coalition to improve upon the status quo, the proposer must also be left better o® from the deal. More generally, we can interpret the formal de¯nition above as a subgroup of S (not necessarily a single individual) making the remaining members a proposal that they \cannot refuse" and that, when accepted, makes each one of the proposers better o®. According to this second interpretation, there is some communication among the agents in the economy, but it is restricted to proposals that cannot be refused. While these two interpretations of an improving coalition lead to the same formal de¯nition in economies with perfect information, they diverge when we deal with economies with asymmetric information.
In this section we follow an axiomatic approach. Instead of generalizing the well-established concept of the Core in a direct way, we generalize the axioms that characterize it on the class of economies with perfect information and then ask if these generalized axioms characterize a solution on the class of economies with asymmetric information. If the answer is in the a±rmative, we can then see what is the solution concept associated with the axioms.
Our starting point is the axiomatization of the Core of cooperative games without transferable utility due to Peleg (1985) , which is based on Consistency, Converse Consistency, Individual rationality and Non-emptiness. Some properties don't seem to be controversial in the way they are generalized. This is the case of Individual Rationality, for instance, or of e±ciency. Generalizations of the reduced economies that are behind the consistency axioms, however, seem less straightforward. In this section we pursue two generalizations that follow from the above two interpretations of improving allocations, respectively.
Axiomatization of the Coarse Core
In this subsection we provide an axiomatization of Wilson's (1978) Coarse Core, using the consistency principle. 7 In order to apply this principle we need to de¯ne the appropriate notion of a reduced economy with respect to a coalition S and a status-quo x 2 A(N ).
The agents that compose this reduced economy are the members of S, and the F -allocations that each sub-coalition F of S can enforce are built as follows. If F is a strict subset of S, then they can get the cooperation of any non-empty coalition G µ N n S by enforcing with them any S [ G-allocation that is commonly known by S [ G to be strictly preferred by them. Note that coalition F can perform this operation without the consent of the other members of the reduced economy. If F chooses not to cooperate with any outside coalition they can still achieve any F -allocation in A(F ). If F = S, they can get the cooperation of any coalition outside S in the same way just described, and add them to the set of S-allocations A(S) that they can enforce without cooperation, but in addition, they can enforce the status-quo x as well. 8
In order to de¯ne the reduced economy, we need the following piece of notation. Let S be a coalition and let x 2 A(N ) be an allocation. The set of S-allocations that are commonly known among the member of S at some state to be strictly preferred to x is:
here is a state ! 2 -at which it is common knowledge
The reduced economy is formally de¯ned as follows.
De¯nition 11 Let E = h(X i ; F i ; u i ; e i ) i2N ; (A(S)) SµN i be an economy, let x 2 A(N) be an allocation and let S be a coalition. The reduced economy with respect to x and S is de¯ned as:
where 
As another important example, consider an economy h(X i ; F i ; u i ; e i ) i2N ; (A(S)) SµN i where for all S µ N , and for all S, A(S) consists of incentive compatible allocations. Let x 2 A(N ), S µ N and F µ S. Allocations in the reduced economy with respect to x and S are incentive compatible as well. To see this note that if y F 2 A S;x (F ) then by the de¯nition of the reduced economy there is a subset G of N n S and an (
is the projection of y on F . But since y is incentive compatible we have that in particular
for all s i 2 T i and for all i 2 F which means that y F is incentive compatible.
Finally, consider on the other hand, the class of economies h(X i ;
where for all S µ N , and for all i 2 S, if y 2 A(S) then y i is measurable with respect to the sigma-algebra generated by [ k2S F k . This class is not closed under the reduction operation.
This can be checked after noting that if a bundle y i is measurable with respect to the ¾-algebra
For our axiomatization it is important to deal with classes of economies that are closed under the reduction operation. These classes are de¯ned as follows.
De¯nition 12
A class E of economies is said to be closed under the reduction operation (closed) if for every E 2 E with set of agents N , for every coalition S µ N; S 6 = ; and for every allocation x 2 A(N ); E S;x 2 E.
The Axioms
Now that the reduced economy is de¯ned, we can state the properties that characterize the Core in the class of perfect information economies. The¯rst axiom is very mild and requires that for economies with only one agent, the solution should recommend an individually rational allocation.
Axiom 1 (OPIR)
A solution ' on a class E of economies satis¯es one person individual rationality if it assigns to each one-person economy a subset of its individually rational allocations.
The next axiom is a little bit stronger than OPIR, in that it requires the solution to assign to one-person economies the set of all its individually rational allocations. It was introduced in Peleg and Tijs (1996) in the context of games in strategic form, and used by Serrano and Volij (1997) in the context of perfect information economies.
Axiom 2 (OPR)
A solution ' on a class E of economies satis¯es one person rationality if it assigns to each one-person economy the set of its individually rational allocations.
The next property requires that the solution not recommend weakly ine±cient allocations.
Axiom 3 (PAR)
A solution ' on a class E of economies satis¯es weak Pareto optimality if it assigns to each economy a subset of its weakly e±cient allocations.
The next axiom is consistency. In our context it requires that if a solution recommends a certain allocation x for an economy with agents set N , it should also recommend the projection of the allocation on S µ N for the reduced economy with respect to S and status-quo x.
Axiom 4 (CONS)
A solution ' on a class E of economies satis¯es consistency if for every E 2 E with set of agents N , for every S µ N; S 6 = ;, x 2 '(E), implies x S 2 '(E S;x ).
The next axiom is a converse of the previous one. It requires from weakly e±cient allocations that if their projections on each proper coalition of the set of agents belong to the solution of the corresponding reduced economy, then the allocation x itself should belong to the solution of the economy.
Axiom 5 (COCONS)
A solution ' on a class E of economies satis¯es converse consistency if the following holds. Let E be an economy in E, and x be a weakly e±cient allocation in E. If x S 2 '(E S;x ), for all S µ N; S 6 = ;; S 6 = N; then x 2 '(E).
It is known (see Peleg (1985) and Serrano and Volij (1997) ) that the Core satis¯es all the above axioms on the class of economies with perfect information. 9 Next we show that the Coarse Core satis¯es these axioms on the class of economies with asymmetric information.
Lemma 1 Let E be a closed class of economies. The Coarse Core satis¯es OPR, OPIR, CONS and COCONS on E.
Proof:
We show that the Coarse Core satis¯es each of the four axioms in order.
OPR For any one-person economy, the coarse Core coincides with the set of individually rational allocations: when restricted to one agent, common knowledge coincides with the knowledge.
OPIR This follows from the fact that the Coarse Core satis¯es OPR.
CONS Let x 2 A(N ) be an allocation and assume that x S 6 2 CC(E S;x ). This means that there is a coalition F µ S that coarsely improves upon x S . In other words, there is an F -allocation y F 2 A S;x (F ) and state ! such that it is common knowledge among the members of F that
Since y F 2 A S;x (F ), either y F 2 A(F ), in which case x 6 2 CC(E), or there is a coalition G µ N n S and F [ G-allocation y 2 A(F [ G) such that 1. y F is the projection of y on F 2. It is common knowledge at some ! among the members of
But this implies that x 6 2 CC(E), since F [ G improves upon x.
COCONS Assume that x 6 2 CC(E). Then, there is a coalition S that coarsely improves upon
x. This means that there exists a state ! ¤ ; and an S-allocation y 2 A(S) such that:
it is common knowledge among the members of S that
If S = N; then x is not weakly e±cient. If S ( N; consider the reduced economy E S;x . Since y 2 A(S), y 2 A S;x (S). By de¯nition of reduced economy x S 2 A S;x (S) as well. Consequently, by (¤¤) again, x S 6 2 CC(E S;x ). 2
The following lemma shows that with the present de¯nition of a reduced economy, Individual
Rationality and consistency implies Weak E±ciency.
Lemma 2 Let ' be a solution that satis¯es OPIR and CONS. Then ' satis¯es PAR.
Proof: Let x 2 '(E) and let i 2 N . By consistency of ' we have x i 2 '(E fig;x ). Since ' satis¯es OPIR, x i is individually rational, namely there is no y i 2 A (fig;x) that is preferred by i at some ! 2 -: This means that there is no allocation y 2 A(N ) and state ! 2 -at which it is common knowledge among the members of N that The following simple and powerful lemma will allow us to characterize the Coarse Core.
Lemma 3 Let ' be a CONS and OPIR solution on E and let Ã be a converse consistent solution on the same class of economies. If '(E) µ Ã(E) for all one-person economies E, then '(E) µ Ã(E); 8 E 2 E.
The proof is by induction. The claim is trivially true for one-person economies. Suppose now that the statement of Lemma 3, holds for all k-person economies, 1 · k · n ¡ 1 and let E 2 E be an n person economy. Let x 2 '(E). Since ' satis¯es OPIR and CONS, by Lemma 2 x is weakly e±cient. By CONS of '; x F 2 '(E F;x ) for all F µ N; N 6 = ;; F 6 = N . By the induction hypothesis, x F 2 Ã(E F;x ) for all F µ N; F 6 = ;; F 6 = N. Since Ã is converse consistent x 2 Ã(E).
2
As a corollary of the above result, we learn that the Coarse Core is the solution concept which is maximal with respect to set inclusion, among those that satisfy OPIR and CONS.
Theorem 1 Let E be a closed class of economies. CC satis¯es OPIR and CONS on E and if ' is another solution that satis¯es the two axioms on E, then '(E) µ CC(E) for all E 2 E.
Proof:
We know from Lemma 1 that the Coarse Core satis¯es OPIR and CONS. Now, if ' satis¯es OPIR and CONS, by Lemma 3 it must be that case that '(E) µ CC(E) for all E 2 E since by Lemma 1, CC satis¯es COCONS on E. 2
We now state a characterization theorem:
Theorem 2 A solution ' on a closed class E of economies satis¯es CONS, COCONS, and OPR if and only if ' = CC.
Proof: By Lemma 1, the Coarse Core satis¯es the three axioms. By Lemma 3, there cannot be two solutions that satisfy the three axioms. 2
Independence of Axioms
All that remains to be shown is that the three axioms are independent. We do so by providing three examples. Consider the class of all economies.
1. The empty solution satis¯es CONS and COCONS but does not satisfy OPR.
2. Consider the solution ' de¯ned as:
The solution ' satis¯es OPR since for any one-person economy PO and IR are the same.
It satis¯es CONS trivially but COCONS is not satis¯ed.
3. PO satis¯es OPR and COCONS but by Theorem 2 it cannot satisfy CONS since PO 6 = CC.
Axiomatization of the Coarse+ Core
In this subsection we provide an axiomatization of the Coarse+ Core, using the consistency principle. In order to apply this principle we need to de¯ne the appropriate notion of a reduced economy with respect to a coalition S and a status-quo x 2 A(N ). Here we follow the approach that in order to get the cooperation of a coalition outside the reduced economy, it is necessary to make a proposal that cannot be refused. Namely, the members of the outside coalition must be made better o® at every state of the world.
The agents that compose this reduced economy are the members of S, and the F -allocations that each sub-coalition F of S can enforce are built as follows. If F is a strict subset of S, then in order to get the cooperation of any coalition G µ N n S it is necessary to enforce with them a S [ G-allocation that provides each member of G with a higher utility level at every state of the world than the utility of the status quo. A proposal like that has the property that no matter what the agents in G learn about the state of the world, they will still be willing to accept it rather than consuming their status quo bundle. Note that coalition F can perform this operation without the consent of the other members of the reduced economy. If F = S, they can get the cooperation of any coalition outside S in the same way just described, but in addition, they can enforce the status-quo x as well.
We begin by de¯ning the set of bundles which dominate the status quo and the stand alone posibilities of an agent.
De¯nition 13
Let i 2 N , and let x i 2 IB i be a bundle for i. The set of non-refusable proposals with respect to x i is de¯ned as:
That is, the set of non-refusable proposals for an agent i with respect to a bundle x i is the set of all bundles which he strictly prefers in all states to the status quo. We now de¯ne the reduced economy which we will use to axiomatize the Coarse+ core.
De¯nition 14
Let E = h(X i ; F i ; u i ; e i ) i2N ; (A(S)) SµN i be an economy, let x 2 A(N) be an allocation and let S be a coalition. The reduced economy with respect to x and S is de¯ned as:
The de¯nitions of the consistency axiom and its converse remain unchanged, but it should be kept in mind that they are de¯ned relative to the new reduced economies. The other axioms are not a®ected by the de¯nition of the reduced economy. Furthermore, the very same arguments that appear after De¯nition 11 also show that among the classes of economies that are closed under this new reduction operation we can¯nd: such that:
and it follows that x is in the Coarse+ Core. On the other hand, if x is not individually rational there exists a state ! and an allocation y such that: CONS Let x 2 A(N ) be an allocation and assume that x S 6 2 C + (E S;x ). This means that there is a coalition F µ S that improves upon x S . In other words there is an F -allocation y F 2 A S;x (F ) and a partition of F into two disjoint sets A and P such that:
It is common knowledge among the members of A at some ! that:
Since y F 2 A S;x (F ), there is a coalition H µ N n S and allocation y 2 A(F [ H) such that:
y F is the projection of y on F .
Consider now F [ H and allocation y 2 A(F [ H)
. It follows that:
It is common knowledge among the members of A at some ! that: COCONS Assume that x 6 2 C + (E). Then, there is a coalition S that Coarsely+ improves upon x. This means that there exists a state ! ¤ 2 -, a partition fA; P g of S and an S-allocation y 2 A(S) such that 1. u i (y i ) > u i (x i ); 8i 2 P 2. It is common knowledge among the members of A at ! ¤ that:
If A = N then x is not weakly e±cient. If A 6 = N consider the reduced economy E A;x . By (¤), y A 2 A A;x (A). Also by de¯nition, x A 2 A A;x (A). Consequently, by (¤) again, x A 6 2 C + (E A;x ). 2 Lemma 5 Let ' be a consistent and weakly e±cient solution on E and let Ã be a converse consistent solution on the same class of economies. If '(E) µ Ã(E) for all one-person economies E, then '(E) µ Ã(E); 8 E 2 E.
Proof:
The proof by induction. The claim is trivially true for one-person economies. Suppose now that the statement of Lemma 5 holds for all k-person economies, 1 · k · N ¡ 1. Let x 2 '(E). Since ' satis¯es PAR, x is weakly e±cient. By CONS of '; x F 2 '(E F;x ) for all F µ N; N 6 = ;; F 6 = N . By the induction hypothesis, x F 2 Ã(E F;x ) for all F µ N; F 6 = ;; F 6 = N .
Since Ã is converse consistent x 2 Ã(E). 2
As a corollary of the above result, we learn that the Coarse+ Core is the solution concept which is maximal with respect to set inclusion, among those that satisfy OPIR PAR and CONS.
Theorem 3 Let E be a closed class of economies. C + satis¯es OPIR, PAR and CONS on E and if ' is another solution that satis¯es the three axioms on E, then '(E) µ C + (E) for all E 2 E.
We know from Lemma 4 that the Coarse+ Core satis¯es OPIR, PAR and CONS. Now, if ' satis¯es OPIR, PAR and CONS, by Lemma 5 it must be that case that '(E) µ C + (E) for all E 2 E since by Lemma 4, C + satis¯es COCONS on E. 2
Theorem 4 A solution ' on a closed class E of economies satis¯es PAR, CONS, COCONS, and OPR if and only if ' = C + .
Proof: By Lemma 4 the Coarse+ Core satis¯es for the four axioms. By Lemma 5, there cannot be two solutions that satisfy the four axioms. 2
Independence of Axioms
All that remains to be shown is that the four axioms are independent. We do so by providing four examples. Consider the class of all economies.
1. PO satis¯es OPR, PAR and COCONS but does not satisfy CONS by Theorem 3. (For a direct proof, consider a weakly e±cient allocation in a three person economy which is (individualistically) improved upon by a two person coalition S and consider their corresponding reduced economy.)
2. The Empty Solution satis¯es is CONS, COCONS and PAR but not OPR.
3. Consider the solution ' de¯ned as:
'(E) = ½ IR(E) if E is a one-person economy ; otherwise.
The solution ' is OPR, CONS and PAR but not COCONS.
4. The Individualistic Core IC satis¯es OPR, CONS and COCONS but not PAR.
Proof:
We show that the IC satis¯es OPR, CONS, and COCONS.
OPR For any one-person economy, IC and IR coincide.
CONS Suppose x s 6 2 IC(E S;x ). This implies that there exists F µ S with i 2 F and a state ! such that F can (individualistically) improve upon x F . That is, 9 y 2 A S;x (F ) such that:
and y k 2 NR ¢ , and constant across states utility functions for both agents given by u(a; b) = minfa; bg.
Endowment (e i ) N Allocation y Agent
ff! 1 g; f! 2 ; ! 3 gg (0; 0) (8; 2) (2; 2) (1; 1) (5; 5) (1; 1) 2 ff! 1 ; ! 2 g; f! 3 gg (2; 2) (2; 8) (0; 0) (1; 1) (5; 5) (1; 1) Table 6 The endowment cannot be (individualistically) improved upon since there is no way to make either agent strictly better o® in every state. However, the endowment is not weakly e±cient since allocation y is strictly prefer at every state by both agents.
